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I. INTRODUCTION

Suppose your law firm represents CrabApple, the large, Californiabased manufacturer of the BuyPod, a portable digital music player.
CrabApple also sells songs from its online music store, BuyTunes, for use
on the BuyPod. One morning, a class-action antitrust lawsuit lands on your
desk. It accuses CrabApple of illegal tying—because the BuyPod is
* J.D. expected 2009, University of Florida Levin College of Law; A.B. in philosophy,
Princeton University. For Taylor and Stella, who sacrificed so much, and who make me a very
lucky guy. I would also like to thank Professor William H. Page for his inspiration and assistance.
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designed to play only music from BuyTunes, and BuyTunes songs only
play on BuyPods.1 CrabApple customers claim the tying has forced them
to make unwanted purchases—BuyPod owners felt compelled to buy their
music from BuyTunes, and anyone who wanted to use BuyTunes had to
get a BuyPod. These consumers claim that the forced purchases damaged
them. You recognize the name of plaintiffs’ law firm at the bottom of the
complaint. The firm has a reputation for aggressive, well-funded, and
protracted consumer litigation. The plaintiffs seek a treble-damage money
judgment. They have filed the lawsuit in a federal district court in the state
of West Dakota. You know West Dakota’s economy has long been mired
in recession, due to factory and farm jobs going overseas. The judicial
division is notorious among defense counsel for rogue juries and large
plaintiffs’ verdicts. You fear the jury pool would have little inclination to
treat your client fairly.
CrabApple has no connection to West Dakota. It has no stores or
offices there, no property or bank account there, and none of its officers
lives or works there. True, its products are purchased there, but the market
is so small and depressed that you don’t think West Dakota even factors
into CrabApple’s marketing plans. Yet despite this lack of contacts,
plaintiffs are seeking personal jurisdiction over your client in West
Dakota, based on the “effects test”2 from Calder v. Jones.3 The lawsuit
claims CrabApple “expressly aimed” its anticompetitive activity at West
Dakota, creating effects that injured consumers there, and justifying the
assertion of jurisdiction by the West Dakota court. You have twenty days
to respond.
Farfetched? Maybe not. In Calder, the Supreme Court held that the
tortious effects that a defendant “expressly aimed” at a forum, without ever

1. For a real-life analogue to this hypothetical, see Slattery v. Apple Computer, Inc., No.
5:05-cv-00037-JW (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 3, 2005). The filings for this case can be found online at
Justia News, The Apple iPod iTunes Anti-Trust Litigation, http://news.justia.com/cases/featured/
california/candce/5:2005cv00037/26768/ (last visited July 14, 2008). One of the predecessor cases
is Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The lawsuits attack
Apple’s failure to license its proprietary digital rights management (DRM) software, FairPlay, to
competing online stores and player makers. See, e.g., Tucker, 493 F. Supp. at 1094. Licensing of
the standard would enable iTunes customers to play the songs they purchase on players other than
the iPod and allow iPod owners to play songs purchased from other music stores besides iTunes.
Id.
2. See, e.g., Tex. Int’l Magnetics, Inc. v. Auriga-Aurex, Inc. (In re Magnetic Audiotape
Antitrust Litig.), 334 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2003) (reading Calder for authority that a court may
exercise effects-test personal jurisdiction over defendant consistent with due process when
defendant is a primary participant in a meeting outside the United States to allegedly direct
price-fixing in the United States). The effects-test inquiry for personal jurisdiction is distinct from
the effects-test inquiry for antitrust subject matter jurisdiction. IB PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 266d2, 272c (3d ed. 2006).
3. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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setting foot there, could provide the basis for personal jurisdiction in that
forum, even in the absence of the usual contacts, such as the presence of
an office or employees.4 The underlying tort in Calder was libel—a
National Enquirer story written in Florida, impugning actor Shirley Jones
in her home state of California.5 But in the nearly twenty-five years since
the Court announced Calder, plaintiffs have analogized and attempted to
apply the Calder test to other torts, including tortious interference with
business relationships,6 infringement of publicity,7 and antitrust
violations.8
Calder required that a defendant “expressly aim[]” its conduct at the
forum.9 This requirement makes sense for the classic effects-test
hypothetical—someone who fires a rifle while standing just inside the
Nevada border, aiming at another person standing in California.10 But with
the globalization of business blurring regional and national boundaries,11

4. Id. at 789. While the phrase “expressly aimed” may be a logical tautology, no one has
questioned its rhetorical punch.
5. Id. at 785.
6. See, e.g., Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 256 (3d Cir. 1998) (denying
Calder jurisdiction for allegations of tortious interference by a defendant based in Germany aimed
at a company headquartered in New Jersey).
7. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 803–07 (9th Cir.
2004) (denying Calder jurisdiction for lack of express aiming by affirming the dismissal of Arnold
Schwarzenegger’s suit for infringement of publicity against an Ohio car dealer who used pictures
of Schwarzenegger’s film character the Terminator in Ohio newspaper ads without
Schwarzenegger’s permission). For an article arguing Schwarzenegger was wrongly decided, see
A. Benjamin Spencer, Terminating Calder: “Effects” Based Jurisdiction In The Ninth Circuit After
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 197, 216–18 (2004) (claiming that
the infringement of the California resident’s right of publicity, rather than the publication of
newspaper ads in Ohio, was the tortious act expressly aimed at California).
8. See, e.g., Tex. Int’l Magnetics, Inc. v. Auriga-Aurex, Inc. (In re Magnetic Audiotape
Antitrust Litig.), 334 F.3d 204, 205 (2d Cir. 2003); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802,
817 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying Calder jurisdiction against English corporation since the contract in
question, though signed by California plaintiffs, did not mention California and was not
“purposefully directed” to instigate any tortious act or effect in California).
9. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
10. See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion to Quash
Service of Summons for Lack of Jurisdiction at 2, DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. McLaughlin, No.
CV-786804 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 2000), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DV
D/filings/CA/opp-pavlovich-mot.html (mentioning the bullet hypothetical).
11. One set of illustrations of the extent of globalization is available from the Swiss think
tank KOF, which has aggregated worldwide economic, social, and political trends into bar graphs
and animated maps. See KOF, INDEX OF GLOBALIZATION, WORLD REGION (2008),
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ (click on “maps” tab; then click on “Display map”). “To suggest
that antitrust and competition concepts are becoming more global is akin to suggesting that iPods
might be more than a fad.” John M. Majoras, Harmonizing the Globalization of Antitrust Laws,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Oct. 2007, at 6. “Another noteworthy trend has been what some
term the ‘Americanization’ of European private enforcement actions. EU Competition
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it is harder to show that a business has expressly aimed its anticompetitive
activity at a particular forum.12 Thus, when companies serving national or
international markets are antitrust defendants, the due process inquiry can
become: When does aiming everywhere mean aiming nowhere? And in
terms of the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note, the question is: Has
CrabApple expressly aimed its conduct at West Dakota in a way that
justifies its being haled into court there? The perverse result, according to
some courts, is that the more widely you aim your anticompetitive
conduct, the safer you are from Calder jurisdiction.13 The cynical advice
to a cartel might be, “don’t aim too carefully.”
This Note suggests that while Calder jurisdiction fits well with some
types of antitrust allegations, the Calder analogy weakens when charges
of broad-based anticompetitive conduct collide with the long-arm statutes
of particular states.14 The risk of forcing the analogy too far, of course, is

Commissioners have been calling for increased private enforcement for some time, and the 2006
green paper addressing the issues makes clear that there is an appetite for greater action.” Id.; see
also William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judgments Convention, 32 LAW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 363 (2001). Professor Dodge wrote:
Because U.S. courts exercise general jurisdiction based on contacts unrelated to
a cause of action and because a foreign company is likely to have more contacts
with the United States (especially if those contacts are assessed on a nationwide
basis) than with a smaller country, U.S. courts will be able to exercise personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants in antitrust cases more often than courts in
smaller countries. Similarly, because of the size of the United States, a foreign
company is more likely to have assets in the United States against which an
antitrust judgment can be enforced than it is to have assets in a smaller country.
Id. at 385.
12. Antitrust complaints now routinely address conduct in a wide variety of national and
international markets including magnetic audiotape, see Tex. Int’l Magnetics, Inc. v. Auriga-Aurex,
Inc. (In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig.), 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003), bulk graphite,
see In re Bulk Extruded Graphite Prods. Antitrust Litig., Civ. No. 02-6030 (WHW), 2007 WL
1062979, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2007), and even livestock vitamins, see Empagran S.A. v. F.
Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092
(2006).
13. See, e.g., Nw. Aluminum Co. v. Hydro Aluminum Deutschland GmbH, No. 02-398-JE,
2003 WL 23571744, at *4–5 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 2003) (noting that a strict application of Calder
would produce the anomalous result that a court “would have jurisdiction over a small scale
conspiracy aimed solely at an individual company within the United States market, but would lack
jurisdiction to consider claims involving a large scale worldwide conspiracy that included numerous
companies within the U.S.”); Cole v. Tobacco Inst., 47 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 (E.D. Tex. 1999)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that “if its intentional wrongdoing was aimed at more than one
state” then the Calder test was not satisfied and observing that such an outcome “goes against
common sense. It implies that a party can avoid liability by multiplying its wrongdoing.”).
14. This Note only addresses specific jurisdiction, which Calder discussed.
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a violation of due process.15 Part II of this Note reviews the facts and
holding of Calder, and some of the key cases that followed it. Part III
addresses the question of how the effects test might be different for
antitrust complaints. Part IV reviews one type of anticompetitive conduct
that seems to place particular strain on the Calder analogy—cartel
practices whose effects are attacked in a particular state. Part V balances
the due process argument for a narrow reading of Calder with policy
considerations supporting a broader application of Calder to antitrust
cases.
II. THE CALDER V . JONES EFFECTS TEST
The Supreme Court issued a number of landmark cases on personal
jurisdiction in the 1980s,16 and given their influence, it first seemed that
Calder might have to fight for attention. However, the flexibility of the
Calder analysis, not to mention the appeal of its tabloid facts, helped
increase its currency. This Part reviews the facts and holdings of Calder,
and then raises five considerations important for a look at Calder today.
First, it is important not to read Calder in isolation; in particular, the
reasonableness analyses of Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz17 and Asahi
Metal Industries Co. v. Superior Court18 play an important role in any
question of personal jurisdiction. Second, plaintiffs have applied Calder
jurisdiction ever more broadly—to other torts, to contract cases, and, in
2006, to a First Amendment case—even as courts continue to wrestle with
the question of what Calder jurisdiction requires. Third is an initial look
at Calder’s crucial requirement for “express aiming.” Fourth, Calder’s
requirements for injury have produced a split in the circuits as to its extent.
And lastly, analysis of the role of state long-arm statutes remains a key
part of the personal jurisdiction inquiry, even though no long-arm statute
was present in Calder. The number of these issues and their subtlety
demand even more care than usual in the ordinary personal jurisdiction
analysis.

15. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment controls a state court’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984).
16. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
17. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
18. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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A. Facts and Holding of the Case
In Calder,19 the Supreme Court held that a state could exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who had no ordinary contacts with the state,
but who had directed the tortious effects of his conduct into the state.20 The
case concerned libel.21 The National Enquirer published a story in October
1979 claiming that actor Shirley Jones drank too heavily to fulfill her
professional obligations.22 She filed a lawsuit in California Superior Court
for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
harm.23 The suit named the Florida-based newspaper and two of its
Florida-based journalists as defendants.24 The newspaper conceded
jurisdiction,25 but both the journalists moved to quash service of process,
and the court ruled for them.26 The state appellate court reversed, finding
that the journalists’ intentional actions in Florida injured Jones in
California, so that jurisdiction was proper.27
In affirming the finding of personal jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme
Court began its analysis with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.28 Under International Shoe Co. v. Washington,29 the Court
noted, a state may assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has
“minimum contacts” with the state, as long as the “suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”30 To comport with
Shaffer v. Heitner,31 the minimum contacts analysis must focus on “‘the

19. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
20. Id. at 789. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
21. Id. at 785.
22. Id. at 788 n.9. In their brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, Jones’ lawyers included the text
of the offending article:
[M]illions of fans of her new TV show, “Shirley,” don’t realize that the seemingly
bubbly star is really crying on the inside. . . . “[Jones’ husband] has driven Shirley
to drink,” charged an inside source . . . . “She pours down vodka so fast that at
first the crew thought she was drinking water. She starts blurring her lines and by
3 o’clock in the afternoon she’s a crying drunk and they have to stop shooting.”
Joint Appendix, Calder, 465 U.S. 783 (No. 82-1401), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 214, at *8–9.
23. Calder, 465 U.S. at 784–85.
24. Id. at 785–86.
25. Id. at 785.
26. Id. at 786.
27. Id. at 786–77.
28. Id. at 788.
29. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
30. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
31. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’”32 The
Court noted that the plaintiff was the focus of the defendants’ activities
that led to the suit.33
The Court concluded that the forum state of California was the focal
point of the challenged conduct.34 The journalists drew on California
sources to describe the California activities of a California resident.35 The
Court reached this conclusion even though the journalists had worked in
Florida. The reporter John South resided in Florida and did most of his
work on the article in Florida, calling sources in California for
information.36 Before the story ran, he called the actor’s home and read the
story to her husband, to get his comments.37 Although South had been to
California numerous times, he strongly denied ever visiting California to
report the Jones story.38 The editor Iain Calder also lived in Florida.39 He
served as editor and president of the National Enquirer,40 which was a
Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Florida.41 Calder
approved the initial story idea and edited its final draft.42 At the time of
publication, Calder had only ever visited California once, on vacation.43
Besides being the focal point of the challenged conduct, the Court held
that California also was the focal point of the harm suffered.44 The
National Enquirer sold 600,000 of its 5-million issues in California—more
than in any other state.45 Jones lived in California, she experienced
emotional distress and damage to her professional reputation in California,
and her television career centered in California.46
Moreover, the Court emphasized that the journalists knew the brunt of
the effects of their work would be felt in California.47 In their appeal, the

32. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204).
33. Id. at 788 (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)).
34. Id. at 789.
35. Id. at 788.
36. Id. at 785.
37. Id. at 785–86.
38. Calder, 465 U.S. at 785 nn.3–4.
39. Id. at 786. Celebrities fascinated the Scottish-born editor Calder. See generally IAIN
CALDER, THE UNTOLD STORY: MY 20 YEARS RUNNING THE NATIONAL ENQUIRER (2004) (discussing
the Gary Hart scandal, a camera hidden in a cummerbund, and the Elvis coffin photo, among other
journalistic coups).
40. Calder, 465 U.S. at 786.
41. Id. at 785.
42. Id. at 786.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 789.
45. Id. at 785.
46. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–89.
47. Id. at 789–90.
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journalists had compared themselves to welders who supposedly worked
in Florida on a boiler, which their employer subsequently shipped to
California, where the boiler exploded.48 The Court rejected this attempt to
recast their conduct as “untargeted negligence.”49
[T]heir intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were
expressly aimed at California. Petitioner South wrote, and
petitioner Calder edited, an article that they knew would have
a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they
knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent
in the State in which she lives and works, and in which the
National Enquirer has its largest circulation.50
Through the journalists’ conduct and their connection with California, the
Court concluded that they should “‘reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there’” to answer for their actions.51 As a final point, the Court noted
that each defendant’s contacts with a forum State must be evaluated
separately.52 By finding personal jurisdiction over the journalists to be
constitutional,53 the Supreme Court found that the effects of the
journalists’ work in California effectively served as a “contact” with
California, even though the individual reporters’ traditional contacts with
the forum were lacking.54 Therefore, the effects test supplemented the
customary analysis of contacts under International Shoe.55 In sum, Calder
premised a finding of personal jurisdiction on (1) an intentional act, (2)
expressly aimed at the forum, and (3) causing harm, the brunt of which the
defendant knew was likely to be felt in the forum.
B. The Reasonableness Inquiry
The Calder analysis presents a separate issue, not unique to
antitrust—the need for a reasonableness inquiry when weighing personal
jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court announced Calder in 1984, a year

48. Id. at 789.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 789–90 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)). A month after the Court announced Calder, Shirley Jones and her husband settled their
libel complaint against the Enquirer for an undisclosed sum. Aljean Harmetz, National Enquirer
Agrees To Settle With Shirley Jones in Libel Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1984, at A17. The
settlement included a retraction printed by the Enquirer, as well as the right for Jones and her
husband to reprint the retraction in paid advertisements as they saw fit. Id.
52. Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
53. Id. at 789–91.
54. Id. at 785–86.
55. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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before Burger King56 and three years before Asahi.57 The latter cases
crystallized the reasonableness factors necessary for a personal jurisdiction
decision to meet the “fair play and substantial justice” test of International
Shoe.58 International Shoe required not only minimum contacts, but fair
play and substantial justice, for a finding of personal jurisdiction.59 The
Calder court seemed to anticipate this test by noting that “[a]n individual
injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from persons
who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in
California.”60 The Burger King and Asahi cases, following shortly after
Calder, made this reasonableness requirement clearer. Yet courts applying
Calder to antitrust cases do not always make explicit the reasonableness
test.61 Moreover, Burger King stated that the reasonableness analysis
operates on an equal footing with minimum contacts, as either a
complement or a counterweight, such that a finding of one can supplement
or negate a finding of the other.62 It is clear, then, that a finding of Calder
jurisdiction is only the first step of the inquiry. Courts also have to apply
the reasonableness analysis refined in Burger King and Asahi.
C. How Courts Have Applied Calder
In applying Calder to claims besides libel, some courts have focused
on the nature of the intentional act, and whether the claim sounds in
contract, tort, or another doctrine.63 Calder itself clearly stated it did not

56. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
57. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (listing
reasonableness factors as “the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief” as well as “‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies’” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
58. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
59. Id.
60. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984).
61. See, e.g., Tex. Int’l Magnetics, Inc. v. Auriga-Aurex, Inc. (In re Magnetic Audiotape
Antitrust Litig.), 334 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2003) (ordering additional discovery to see if a Calder
analysis could justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction, while making no mention of a
reasonableness inquiry).
62. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 477–78 (1985). (“[M]inimum requirements
inherent in the concept of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ may defeat the reasonableness of
jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities. . . . [J]urisdictional
rules may not be employed in such a way as to make litigation ‘so gravely difficult and
inconvenient’ that a party unfairly is at a ‘severe disadvantage’ in comparison to his opponent.”
(citations omitted)).
63. See, e.g., County of Stanislaus v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. CV-F-93-5866-OWW, 1995
WL 819149, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1995) (rejecting defendant’s claim that the Ninth Circuit
disapproved the application of Calder to antitrust cases, or to any cases “beyond a narrow class of
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apply to negligence.64 In recent years, Calder has been extensively applied
to a variety of claims accruing via the Internet.65 The Ninth Circuit has
read Calder broadly, applying it to tort claims of infringement of
publicity66 and product liability,67 as well as contract68 claims, and, in
2006, a claim involving the First Amendment.69
The federal circuit courts have cast Calder in different ways. The Third
Circuit, in a 1998 case concerning tortious interference, stated the Calder
requirements this way:
First, the defendant committed an intentional tort. Second, the
forum was the focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff
as a result of that tort. Third, the forum was the focal point of
the tortious activity in the sense that the tort was “expressly
aimed” at the forum. Essential was a corollary finding that the
defendants knew that the “brunt” of the injury caused by their
tortious acts would be felt by the plaintiff in the forum.70
In that case, the Third Circuit pointed out that the circuits had split on the
issue of locating the injury under Calder.71 When analyzing for Calder

tort cases that involve almost exclusively libel and slander claims,” and finding Calder jurisdiction
over Canadian natural gas reseller who primarily focused on serving California customers); see also
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. C & C Helicopter Sales, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-1516-X, 2001 WL
290569, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2001) (citing Calder, Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141
F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998), and Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 1999)) (“[T]he
dilution of trademark and trademark counterfeiting causes of action are not the sort of ‘aimable’
intentional torts that were present in Calder (libel), Panavision (trademark extortion), or Guidry
(fraud and misrepresentation).”).
64. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789; see also Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 264 (3d
Cir. 1998) (“Calder clearly was clearly [sic] not concerned with negligence . . . .”).
65. See, e.g., TiTi Nguyen, Note, A Survey of Personal Jurisdiction Based on Internet
Activity: A Return to Tradition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (2004) (concluding that many courts
have reverted to Calder and other “traditional” paradigms when weighing personal jurisdiction in
Internet-related litigation).
66. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2004).
67. Pac. Atl. Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758 F.2d 1325, 1330 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)
(noting that the broader finding of jurisdiction in products liability cases was due to the “strong
state interest in protecting its citizens against harmful products”).
68. Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir.
1986).
69. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206
(9th Cir. 2006).
70. Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998) (denying Calder
jurisdiction for allegations of tortious interference aimed at a company headquartered in New
Jersey).
71. Id. at 261–65. For more discussion of the various circuit courts’ approaches to the injury
issue, see infra Part II.e.
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jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit noted, “[t]he substance, not form, of the
defendant’s activities is dispositive.”72 The Ninth Circuit has also said that
Calder requires “‘something more’” than mere foreseeability to justify a
finding of jurisdiction.73 While Calder has clearly been applied to a wide
variety of claims, courts must be cautious about a “one size fits all
approach.” There are several reasons why antitrust places a particular
strain on the Calder analogy,74 and arguably the most important one
involves Calder’s requirement for express aiming.
D. Express Aiming, Asahi, and “Without More”
Calder’s requirement for express aiming may be its most distinctive
feature, and one that has proved inconsistent in its application. While a
fuller discussion of express aiming as applied to antitrust will follow,75 it
is important to note that Calder jurisdiction has at least some overlap with
the Court’s stream of commerce analysis in Asahi.76 While the Asahi Court
split and its pluralities failed to advance a single theory, the O’Connor
plurality found that “[t]he placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State.”77 The something “more,” the Court
wrote, might be marketing, advertising, service, or design done with the
forum in mind.78 The Eighth Circuit compared the holdings of Asahi and
Calder when deciding a question of personal jurisdiction in a trademark

72. Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1398. Despite the Haisten court’s emphasis on substance over form,
the Ninth Circuit went on to state in 2004 that “availment and direction are, in fact, two distinct
concepts. A purposeful availment analysis is most often used in suits sounding in contract. A
purposeful direction analysis, on the other hand, is most often used in suits sounding in tort.”
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
The functional difference of the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between availment and direction, for
purposes of Calder jurisdiction, is not immediately apparent.
73. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 805 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l
Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000)).
74. See infra Part IV.
75. See infra Part III.b.
76. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109–13 (1987).
77. Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
78. Id. In personal jurisdiction analyses, courts sometimes seem to repeat and modify the
“without more” language of Asahi with the phrase “something more.” See, e.g., Rio Props., Inc. v.
Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that local newspaper
advertising in the forum state was the “something more” that tipped the scales for assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a largely passive Internet site, thereby creating a Calder-style effect that
satisfied the “purposeful availment” prong of the specific jurisdiction test).
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infringement case.79 Such reasoning highlights the extent to which the two
theories are cousins in the realm of personal jurisdiction theory.
E. Locating the Injury Under Calder
A separate issue in the cases citing Calder was whether the brunt of
injury had to accrue in the forum. The Supreme Court in Calder held that
the forum state California was the focus of the harm suffered.80 However,
lower courts have subsequently varied this requirement. In the 2006 case,
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme,81 the Ninth
Circuit, noting its varying positions in the past on this question, announced
that going forward it would not require the brunt of Calder harm to be
suffered in the forum.82 A Seventh Circuit opinion also seemed to adopt a
more flexible standard for injury, holding in 1997 that “the state in which
the victim of a tort suffers the injury may entertain a suit against the
accused tortfeasor.”83
The Third Circuit, however, has applied Calder’s injury requirement
more narrowly. In reviewing a claim of tortious interference with business
relationships, the Third Circuit held in 1998 in Imo Industries, Inc. v.
Kiekert AG84 that Calder required that the brunt of the injury be felt in the
forum state of New Jersey, and that the defendant had to know the brunt
of the harm would fall there.85 The Imo court cited decisions from the
Tenth,86 Fifth,87 and Fourth88 circuits for the proposition that Calder is not
satisfied by “the mere allegation that the plaintiff feels the effect of the
defendant’s tortious conduct in the forum because the plaintiff is located
there.”89 Holding otherwise would “carve out a special intentional torts
79. Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1391 (8th Cir. 1991)
(finding Calder analogized more closely than Asahi to an allegation of intentional trademark
infringement); see also iAccess, Inc. v. WEBcard Techs., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (D. Utah
2002) (reading Asahi and Calder together for the requirement that the defendant “expressly aimed”
or “intentionally directed” alleged tortious interference with business relations at residents of the
forum state).
80. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
81. 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
82. Id. at 1207. The Ninth Circuit cited as authority for its conclusion the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), announced the same
day as Calder v. Jones. In Keeton, the Court upheld a finding of personal jurisdiction in New
Hampshire even though “‘[i]t is undoubtedly true that the bulk of the harm done to petitioner
occurred outside New Hampshire.’” Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780).
83. Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997).
84. 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998).
85. Id. at 265–66.
86. Far W. Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1080 (10th Cir. 1995).
87. Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 772–73 (5th Cir. 1988).
88. ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625–26 (4th Cir. 1997).
89. Imo, 155 F.3d at 263.
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exception to the traditional specific jurisdiction analysis.”90 Such a finding,
for example, would confer personal jurisdiction in a forum where a
plaintiff corporation incurred lost profits as the result of a business
arrangement.91 The upshot of the Third Circuit’s narrow reading of injury
location in Imo could be that antitrust plaintiffs there could have a harder
time establishing Calder jurisdiction over defendants.
F. Interaction with State Long-arm Statutes
The Court in Calder ruled solely on the constitutionality of the state
court’s assertion of effects-test personal jurisdiction.92 Since California law
permits courts to find personal jurisdiction to the same extent allowed by
the U.S. Constitution, there was no analysis of a state long-arm statute.93
Likewise, many antitrust cases avoid consideration of a long-arm statute,
as many antitrust suits, particularly those involving international
conspiracies, are brought under § 12 of the Clayton Act,94 which provides
for worldwide service of process against antitrust defendants.95 The
process provision effectively serves as a broad grant of personal
jurisdiction against antitrust defendants: “The ensuing minimum contacts
analysis looks to a corporation’s contacts with the United States as a
whole,” in applying the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.96
Therefore, antitrust plaintiffs seeking Calder jurisdiction in those cases do
not have to contend with a state long-arm statute.
In other antitrust fact patterns, however, the role of a state long-arm
statute looms large. Courts have indicated that restrictive language of state
long-arm statutes can further limit the reach of Calder jurisdiction over
antitrust defendants, as in In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation.97 This Note
discusses the issues implicated by this case in Part IV.

90. Id. at 265.
91. Id. at 263.
92. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984).
93. Id. at 786 n.5.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
95. Id. The circuit courts of appeal have split on the question of whether § 12’s venue
provision must be satisfied before invoking its worldwide service-of-process provision. For an
excellent discussion of this issue, see Jordan G. Lee, Note, Section 12 of the Clayton Act: When
Can Worldwide Service of Process Allow Suit in Any District?, 56 FLA. L. REV. 673 (2004), cited
with approval in Ky. Speedway, LLC v. NASCAR, 410 F. Supp. 2d 592, 600–01 (E.D. Ky 2006)
(“This court agrees with the view expressed in the conclusion of the Florida Law Review
article . . . .”).
96. Tex. Int’l Magnetics, Inc. v. Auriga-Aurex, Inc. (In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust
Litig.), 334 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 2003).
97. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., Misc. No. 99-197, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25073 (D.D.C.
Oct. 30, 2001). For a discussion of the issues implicated by this case, see infra Part IV.a.
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In summary, it is clear that a proper application of Calder requires
more than the three-part test from the case law. Reasonableness must be
considered, as well as any applicable long-arm statute. For some cases
these additional factors can be decisive. But first another question arises:
Do the particular features of antitrust subject matter change the Calder
jurisdiction analysis? Likely they do, for as the Imo court wrote, “Calder’s
holding cannot be severed from its facts.”98
III. THE EFFECTS TEST : DIFFERENT FOR ANTITRUST ?
Is Calder jurisdiction different for antitrust allegations? Or to put the
question much more generally, how much does a lawsuit’s subject matter
modulate the personal jurisdiction analysis? For Calder, the snap answer
is that the conduct is the contact. As courts have analogized Calder to
other cases, they have wrestled with the extent to which the subject matter
affects personal jurisdiction. Some antitrust plaintiffs have successfully
obtained Calder jurisdiction over defendants in federal district courts.99
Others have not.100 This Part has three divisions. The first is a brief

98. Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998).
99. See, e.g., CDI Int’l, Inc. v. Marck, No. 04-4837, 2005 WL 146890, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
21, 2005) (finding effects-test personal jurisdiction over Ohio competitor for directing theft of
importer’s trade secrets from trash in Pennsylvania, and interfering with supplier relationship, and
noting “[t]he Calder ‘effects test’ recognizes that the ‘unique relations among the defendant, the
forum, the intentional tort, and the plaintiff may under certain circumstances render the defendant’s
contacts with the forum—which would otherwise not satisfy the requirements of due
process—sufficient’” (quoting Imo, 155 F.3d at 265)); Midland v. F. Hoffman-Laroche, Ltd. (In
re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.), 270 F. Supp. 2d 15, 32 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding effects-test personal
jurisdiction over defendant in Kansas and Illinois for fixing prices of vitamin ingredient, and noting
that “the Illinois construction of the ‘effects test’ is among the most broad”); Gardner v. Clark, 101
F. Supp. 2d 468, 476 (N.D. Miss. 2000); Snow v. Am. Morgan Horse Ass’n, No. 93-463-JD, 1989
WL 508485, at *7 (D.N.H. Sept. 20, 1989) (finding plaintiff horse breeder contesting expulsion by
competitors from registry “has adequately alleged that the investigation was an intentional act
aimed at the plaintiff’s business” in the forum state); Velcro Group Corp. v. Billarant, 692 F. Supp.
1443, 1448 (D.N.H. 1988).
100. See, e.g., Fleury v. Cartier Int’l, No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2006 WL 2934089, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 13, 2006) (denying Calder jurisdiction against French company because allegations failed
to show it purposefully directed action at the United States to instigate a tying scheme in Cartier
watch parts); Pokermatic Inc. v. Pokertek, Inc., No. 06-3258, 2006 WL 2803037, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 27, 2006) (denying Calder jurisdiction in Pennsylvania and noting plaintiff “‘ignores the
critical difference between an act which has an effect in the forum and one directed at the forum
itself’” (quoting Surgical Laser Techs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 281, 285 (E.D. Pa.
1996))); Am. Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Mueller Eur., Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 2d 821, 829 (W.D. Tenn.
2006) (“Plaintiffs’ collection of irrelevant facts, conclusory statements, and bald allegations falls
well short of a showing that Mueller Europe ‘expressly aimed’ its conduct at the forum . . . .”); Nw.
Aluminum Co. v. Hydro Aluminum Deutschland GmbH, No. 02-398-JE, 2003 WL 23571744, at
*5 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 2003) (denying Calder jurisdiction for plaintiffs’ failure to show they suffered
direct harm from subsidiary of German corporation’s alleged fixing of prices for carbon cathode
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consideration of how the tort of antitrust fits into the Calder framework,
with attention to the unique nature of antitrust injury. Second is a review
of the interaction of antitrust allegations with Calder’s key requirement for
express aiming. The last is a discussion of how the distinction between the
two most basic types of antitrust violations—cartel conduct and
exclusionary conduct—might affect the outcome in Calder jurisdiction
analyses.
A. Antitrust and Libel: An Odd Couple of Torts?
The problems of analogizing the effects test to anticompetitive
behavior flow largely from the fact that Calder involved the distinct tort
of libel. So some comparing and contrasting of these torts helps. Antitrust
is also a tort101—a doctrine of civil reparation, with an analogue in the
criminal law.102 Moreover, antitrust and libel both are intentional torts.
Calder itself and some of the following cases made it clear that Calder
jurisdiction would not apply to allegations of negligence.103

block as required by the Ninth Circuit’s effects test); Gen. Cigar Holdings, Inc. v. Altadis, S.A., 205
F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“Unlike California in Calder, there has been no showing
that Florida was the focal point of either Altadis, S.A.’s alleged illegal activities or the alleged harm
suffered by Plaintiff. . . . The minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause would be
worthless if foreign defendants could be brought before a court in Florida merely by alleging
‘illegal effects within the United States.’ Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
establish that Altadis, S.A. has purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in
Florida.”); Mgmt. Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enters., Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520, 526 (N.D. Tex. 2001)
(declining to find Calder jurisdiction because of lack of express aiming towards Texas, and because
plaintiff’s presence in forum was “‘mere fortuity’” and finding that “[t]o hold otherwise would be
to destroy altogether the limits imposed by due process” (citing Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v.
C & C Helicopter Sales, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-1516-X, 2001 WL 290569, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21,
2001))); Sea-Roy Corp. v. Parts R Parts, No. 1:94CV00059, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21859, at
*32–34 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 15, 1995) (failure to show express aiming at forum); Kane Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Klombers, No. 87-6594, 1988 WL 26462, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1988).
101. See, e.g., Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 854 F.2d 389, 394 (11th Cir. 1988); In
re Bulk [Extruded] Graphite Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 02-6030 (WHW), 2006 WL 1084093, at
*7 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2006).
102. The Sherman Act provides both civil and criminal penalties for antitrust violations. 15
U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 2004). Therefore, antitrust superficially resembles other torts like battery,
assault, or false imprisonment, all of which have analogues in the criminal law. To this extent, libel
may be slightly anomalous. “Many people have argued that criminal libel laws are unconstitutional,
but the Supreme Court has never so held.” Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/posts/1124822280.shtml (Aug. 23, 2005, 2:38 EST). The Supreme Court’s last
relevant decision, Garrison v. Louisiana, reversed a criminal libel conviction. 379 U.S. 64, 77–79
(1964). However, the case “did not go further and suggest that all criminal libel laws are per se
impermissible.” Posting of Eugene Volokh, supra.
103. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984); see also Imo, 155 F.3d at 264 (“Calder clearly
was clearly [sic] not concerned with negligence . . . .”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 4

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

930

[V ol. 60

As a tort, antitrust encompasses a wide array of behavior. Section 2 of
the Sherman Act forbids conduct in support of the illegal acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly power104—presumably because of the effects of
monopoly on consumer welfare.105 But a § 1 violation may be more
complicated in its presentation. Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids
unreasonable “contracts, combinations or conspiracies” in restraint of
trade.106 Therefore, the § 1 antitrust offense is an agreement—an
agreement to fix prices or divide sales territories, for instance. In other
words, the violation is a contract or quasi-contract deemed illegal and
unenforceable as a matter of public policy. A § 1 violation might in some
cases present itself as a contract, possibly eluding the application of Calder
when warranted, if a court focuses too much on the form rather than the
substance of the conduct.107
A tort is all about the injury, of course, and by this measure the
differences between libel and antitrust violations provide a little contrast.
Libel redresses injury to a plaintiff’s reputation. Antitrust, however,
remedies injury to competition108—an even more intangible idea. The
104. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 2004).
105. Circuit Judge Learned Hand wrote in Alcoa that:
[E]ven though we disregarded all but economic considerations, it would by no
means follow that such concentration of producing power is to be desired, when
it has not been used extortionately. Many people believe that possession of
unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses
energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant,
to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an
inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 2004).
107. For further discussion of the form/substance distinction, see supra notes 63–72 and
accompanying text. In McGlinchy, the Calder analysis focused on the alleged anticompetitive effect
of a contract signed by the parties. McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 817–18 (9th Cir.
1988). On the other hand, there is perhaps at least one type of per se § 1 violation to which Calder
could never properly be applied—an illegal agreement without effect. Socony Vacuum’s famous
footnote 59 interpreted § 1 to forbid price-fixing agreements as per se illegal, even if the agreeing
parties lack the power to put the agreement into effect in the market. United States v.
Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). The lack of effect anywhere would
preclude the assertion of Calder jurisdiction in a foreign forum. As a practical matter, such an
agreement would probably never be the subject of civil or criminal prosecution.
108. Antitrust’s specific requirements for injury have generated much commentary. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Essay, Trademark Law and Status Signaling: Tattoos for the Privileged, 59
FLA. L. REV. 195, 215 (2007) (“The plaintiff’s interest and the public’s interests (in more
competitive markets) must be aligned for the plaintiff to have standing.”); Simon A. Rodell,
Comment, Antitrust Law: The Fall of the Morton Salt Rule in Secondary-Line Price Discrimination
Cases, 58 FLA. L. REV. 967, 974–75 (2006) (describing the Supreme Court’s uncoupling of
competitor injury from the injury-to-competition damage analysis for one type of Robinson-Patman
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seminal case of Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.109 held
antitrust law specifically does not protect a competitor who suffers
financial loss resulting from legal competition.110 A court applying Calder
to an antitrust complaint needs to make sure that the injurious effect is one
covered by the antitrust law. In Brunswick, the maker of bowling alley
equipment bought a number of financially struggling bowling alleys in
New Jersey during a time of decreased popularity of bowling.111 A rival
bowling alley operator sued, alleging that even though Brunswick
controlled only two percent of all U.S. alleys, the mergers and
Brunswick’s “deep pocket[s]” would lead to unfair competition.112 The
Supreme Court vacated a jury verdict against Brunswick, however, ruling
that vigorous competition was the goal of antitrust law—even if the
competition had the effect of hurting the business of a less-efficient
competitor.113 The Court found that “[t]he antitrust laws . . . were enacted
for ‘the protection of competition not competitors.’ It is inimical to the
purposes of these laws to award damages for the type of injury claimed
here.”114 These considerations need to be weighed alongside the
restrictions of Calder.
As Imo stated, if the mere fact of lost revenues registering in a
corporation’s home state sufficed to give the state personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, Calder would authorize jurisdiction in every district
where a corporation incurred a loss.115 “[W]hile it is true that a corporation
‘feels’ lost sales at its headquarters, permitting Calder to be satisfied on
this basis would mean that jurisdiction in intentional tort cases would
always be appropriate in the plaintiff’s home state, since the plaintiff
always ‘feels’ the impact of the tort there.”116 While acknowledging that
its narrow reading of Calder might “limit the types of business tort cases”
to which it could be applied, the Imo court noted that Calder did not
“carve out a special intentional torts exception to the traditional specific
jurisdiction analysis, so that a plaintiff could always sue in his or her home
state.”117
Injury is only one aspect of antitrust’s unique standing doctrine that
plaintiffs must negotiate. Other requirements of antitrust standing—that

Act claim).
109. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
110. Id. at 489.
111. Id. at 479–80.
112. Id. at 480, 487.
113. Id. at 489.
114. Id. at 488 (citation omitted) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962)).
115. Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 1998).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 265.
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only direct purchasers may bring private causes of action,118 for
example—do not implicate the personal jurisdiction question. These
hurdles probably offer plaintiffs greater challenges these days, in the light
of the Supreme Court’s growing skepticism about thinly-pleaded antitrust
complaints.119 The narrowness of the antitrust doctrines of injury and
standing seem to suggest that Calder ought to apply narrowly to antitrust
complaints as well.
B. The Requirement of Express Aiming
Perhaps the knottiest part of applying effects-test jurisdiction to
antitrust allegations is Calder’s requirement for express aiming. If a firm
directs conduct towards a given market, say to tailor products or
advertising specifically for that market, it is reasonable to conclude that it
is aiming at that market.120 But the mere act of production, Asahi seems to
suggest, is not by itself aiming.121 The same analysis should apply to
allegations of anticompetitive conduct. But some cases suggest that if a
firm aims anticompetitive conduct broadly, it has not aimed anywhere.
Such a holding would seem to immunize anticompetitive practices that
focus on huge markets, or practices that take pains not to “aim”
anywhere.122 In 2003, the Second Circuit reviewed the application of
Calder jurisdiction in In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litigation.123
While the court’s analysis is brief and lacks a discussion of
reasonableness, it provides a good example of express aiming in a cartel
case, one that withstands a narrow reading of Calder.
In Magnetic Audiotape, a private antitrust class action was filed against
German and Korean makers and distributors of magnetic audiotape,
accusing them of a conspiracy to fix the price of magnetic tape in the
U.S.124 The defendants allegedly had a market share exceeding 90% for

118. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745–46 (1977). Congress has declined to overturn
this finding. More than half the states have overruled Illinois Brick for state antitrust matters,
thereby allowing indirect purchasers to sue under state competition laws. Kevin J. O’Connor, Is the
Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, ANTITRUST, Summer 2001, at 34–35.
119. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007) (expressing concern
about the high cost of antitrust discovery to defendants, in dismissing an antitrust complaint for
failing to sufficiently plead allegations of concerted action).
120. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
121. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Nw. Aluminum Co. v. Hydro Aluminum Deutschland GmbH, No. 02-398-JE,
2003 WL 23571744, at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 2003) (noting the “anomolous [sic] result that this court
would have jurisdiction over a small-scale conspiracy aimed solely at an individual company within
the United States market, but would lack jurisdiction to consider claims involving a large scale
worldwide conspiracy that included numerous companies within the U.S.”).
123. 334 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2003).
124. Id. at 206. In addition to using Calder’s effects test, plaintiffs in these situations
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magnetic audiotape sold in the U.S. in the mid-1990s.125 One defendant
was SKM Ltd., a Korean corporation with its headquarters in Seoul.126
SKM’s American subsidiary had a 40% market share in the U.S.127
However, SKM itself had no office, bank account, or license to do
business in the U.S., nor did any of its employees work or reside in the
U.S.128 SKM filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.129
The trial court granted the motion, finding the plaintiffs had failed to
allege facts showing SKM participated in price-fixing aimed at the U.S.
sufficient to warrant a finding of personal jurisdiction.130 The Second
Circuit vacated the order and remanded with instructions to allow the
plaintiffs limited discovery on the question of personal jurisdiction.131
The Second Circuit began its analysis by asking the question—did
SKM have sufficient minimum contacts with the U.S. to satisfy due
process?132 It noted that the plaintiff had pleaded allegations about a
meeting in Seoul at which price-fixing took place.133 An SKM executive
attended that meeting, according to minutes of the meeting that the
plaintiffs submitted.134
The allegations provided a good basis for a finding of express aiming.
Indeed, the minutes contained many persuasive details.135 Translated into

sometimes use a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction. See infra notes 188–89 and
accompanying text.
125. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants and Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant at 24, Magnetic
Audiotape, 334 F.3d 204 (No. 02-7687), 2002 WL 32872513, at *24.
126. Brief for Defendant-Appellee SKM Ltd. at 6, Magnetic Audiotape, 334 F.3d 204 (No.
02-7687), 2002 WL 32872511, at *6.
127. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 125, at 27.
128. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 126, at 7.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Magnetic Audiotape, 334 F.3d at 209.
132. Id. at 207.
133. Id. at 208.
134. Id.
135. Plaintiffs’ reply brief filed with the Second Circuit contained the following passage:
In its responses to interrogatories, [SKM’s American affiliate] expressly admitted
that Sung-Eiu Song, an SKM executive, attended the April 1995 meeting in Seoul
along with Bernard Geisler of BASF, among others. SKM’s attempt to relegate
the Seoul meeting to footnote status and gloss it over as “a short culturally
required courtesy meeting” is at odds with the evidence.
Indeed a document produced by [the affiliate] relating to the April 28, 1995
meeting between BASF and SKM in Korea entitled “BASF Meeting Agenda”
contains, inter alia, a handwritten English translation of an agenda item: “Price
increases in USA market have been preliminarily agreed as follows” with a listing
of prices and tape grades. Similarly, another document produced by [the affiliate]
detailing the discussions at the April 28, 1995 meeting is entitled “Conference
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English, the memorandum bore the heading: “The Market Situation and
the Possibility of Mutual Cooperation in Raising Product Prices.”136 An
entry titled “Agreed details on the price raise in America” stated that
“‘BASF’s selling price on chrome is 10% lower than SKM. SKM requests
BASF [a co-defendant German corporation] to raise the price to 5.80
cents/100 ft. Geisler from BASF agrees.’”137 As the plaintiff’s attorney
said, “such direct evidence of participation in price-fixing is relatively rare
in antitrust litigation.”138 Typically, antitrust plaintiffs lack direct evidence
of agreement, and instead have to marshal evidence from which a factfinder can infer agreement.139
The court read Calder as supporting a finding of personal jurisdiction
when “defendant is a primary participant in intentional
wrongdoing—albeit extraterritorially—expressly directed at forum.”140
While conceding its executive’s presence at the meeting, the defendant
SKM had characterized it as a “‘short, culturally required courtesy
meeting,’” the court noted.141 SKM denied that price-fixing occurred,142
but the court held it had no power to resolve questions of fact on a motion
to dismiss.143 Remand also was appropriate, the court held, in view of the
possibility the district court might have overlooked the specific allegation
from the minutes of the meeting.144 The court concluded that these

Memo.” The English translation of that document has a subject heading “The
Market Situation and the Possibility of Mutual Cooperation in Raising Product
Prices.” Under the subheading “Negotiated Matters on Price Raise” is an entry
setting forth “Agreed details on the price raise in America,” which describes the
price-fixing agreements reached by the participants: “BASF’s selling price on
chrome is 10% lower than SKM. SKM requests BASF to raise the price to 5.80
cents/100 ft. Geisler from BASF agrees.”
This is clear evidence of SKM’s participation in the conspiracy to raise prices
of magnetic audiotape sold in the United States. Indeed, such direct evidence of
participation in price-fixing is relatively rare in antitrust litigation.
Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants and Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant at 2–3, Magnetic
Audiotape, 334 F.3d 204 (No. 02-7687), 2002 WL 32872512, at *2–3 (citations and annotations
omitted).
136. Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted).
137. Id. at 2–3 (emphasis omitted).
138. Id. at 3.
139. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (granting motion to
dismiss antitrust complaint that failed to plead facts sufficient to elevate allegations of concerted
action “from conceivable to plausible”).
140. Magnetic Audiotape, 334 F.3d at 208.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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allegations by themselves “arguably” satisfied the effects test under
Calder.145
Oddly, the Second Circuit included no reasonableness analysis in its
personal jurisdiction consideration, despite the fact that both sides briefed
the issue. The defendant SKM contended it should not have to shoulder the
burden of facing litigation in New York.146 Plaintiffs, however, argued for
the reasonableness of Calder jurisdiction in their brief, quoting Asahi
factors.147 Besides the strong facts present in the meeting minutes, the
plaintiffs’ argument drew strength from the fact they had brought suit
under § 12 of the Clayton Act, allowing worldwide service of process.148
This wrinkle meant that the plaintiffs could aggregate the defendant’s
contacts with the U.S. as a whole, rather than for a single state.149 In
conclusion, there is a strong indication of express aiming that justifies the
Second Circuit’s approval of Calder jurisdiction in Magnetic Audiotape.
The strong facts of express aiming in Magnetic Audiotape stand in
clear contrast to the facts of McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co.,150 where the
Ninth Circuit found a fatal lack of allegations of express aiming, in an
opinion just four years after Calder was announced.151 In a California
court, plaintiffs argued that a contract they had signed with Shell
International Chemical Company (SICC), a British corporation,
purposefully directed anti-competitive activity in the sale of polybutylene
resin towards California.152 The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument,
noting that the contract neither mentioned California nor purposefully
directed any tortious act or effect towards California.153 “The contract
makes no reference to California, to appellants’ residence in California, or
to any reliance on appellants’ facilities in California.”154 The argument that
the contract satisfied the requirements of Calder jurisdiction was
“specious,” the court found.155
145. Id.
146. Brief for Defendant-Appellee, supra note 126, at 20 (“[I]t will be burdensome for SKM,
a Korean corporation reorganization in bankruptcy, with no offices in the United States, to litigate
this complex matter and effectively defend itself in the United States. All of SKM’s witnesses are
located in Korea, speak Korean and would have to travel to New York for trial.” (citation omitted)).
147. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 125, at 37.
148. Magnetic Audiotape, 334 F.3d at 206–07.
149. Id. at 207.
150. 845 F.2d 802, 817 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying applicability of Calder jurisdiction against
English corporation since contract in question, though signed by California plaintiffs, did not
mention California and was not purposefully directed to instigate any tortious act or effect in
California).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 805, 817.
153. Id. at 817.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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The contract does not name the United States. It does name
twenty-one other countries. There are no terms in the contract
which would indicate that SICC contemplated an effect in
California, much less that any such effect should be
considered a material term of agreement. The contract was
“purposefully directed” at activities in nations other than the
United States; appellants concede this when they recite their
“willingness and ability” to “travel anywhere, anytime and
any place . . . to expand the market for [SICC’s product].”156
Reading McGlinchy and Magnetic Audiotape together, one may
conclude that a close reading of the complaint will reliably show whether
the allegations reveal express aiming. As will be discussed in Part IV,
alleging this express aiming becomes more difficult when the target forum
is a state rather than the U.S.—when the target is smaller. In those cases,
specific allegations of express aiming become even more important.
C. Price-fixing Versus Exclusionary Practices
The application of Calder jurisdiction also has varied depending on the
theory of the underlying antitrust complaint. Anticompetitive conduct
generally falls into one of two broad categories—cartel behavior and
exclusionary conduct.157 Cartel behavior comprises some of the most
familiar activities associated with antitrust—agreements about maximum
price, agreements about minimum price, and agreements to divide
territory. Exclusionary conduct includes concerted refusals to deal, also
known as boycotts; exclusive dealing contracts; and tying. Exclusionary
conduct can be attacked as an illegal agreement under § 1; or it can be
attacked as conduct in support of the acquisition or maintenance of a
monopoly, in violation of § 2.158 The upshot for Calder jurisdiction is that
some anticompetitive conduct is by its nature aimed specifically—aiming
a boycott to harm a rival who is deemed a threat,159 for example, or in
Magnetic Audiotape, conspiring to fix prices for a product in the U.S.
market.160 Cases like Magnetic Audiotape typify many recent civil antitrust
156. McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 817 (alterations in original).
157. See generally A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other
Exclusionary Conduct—Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 376–78 (2006)
(discussing different forms of anticompetitive conduct).
158. See id. at 377.
159. Examples of boycotts that were well-aimed at rivals, and that predate Calder, include
Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461 (1941), and Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 611 (1914).
160. Tex. Int’l Magnetics, Inc. v. Auriga-Aurex, Inc. (In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust
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actions that are sometimes called “follow-ons,” private litigation that
follows a criminal investigation into allegations of price-fixing.161 The
earlier criminal investigations sometimes yield plea agreements162 and
internal documents163 that provide excellent prima facie evidence of the
specific plotting and aiming of conduct at U.S. markets. This evidence of
aiming anticompetitve conduct makes the use of Calder jurisdiction
suitable.
More problematic, though, are allegations of anticompetitive conduct
that lack this fine-point focus. One example was the hypothetical at the
beginning of this Note. The imaginary defendant CrabApple just didn’t
seem to be targeting aggrieved consumers in the forum state, West Dakota.
This problem plays out in plenty of actual cases as well, particularly when
plaintiffs seeking Calder jurisdiction must satisfy not only constitutional
mandates, but also the requirements of a state long-arm statute. When
evidence of express aiming does not materialize, Calder jurisdiction
becomes problematic. The next Part explores this difficulty.
IV. CALDER IN ANTITRUST : STRAINING THE ANALOGY
Calder jurisdiction can hit problems when applied to conduct allegedly
aimed at a state. The defendant may claim, sometimes convincingly, that
the smaller forum never entered its thoughts. No express aiming, of course,
means no Calder jurisdiction. Such a situation can highlight the due
process problems associated with misapplication of Calder. This Part has
two divisions. The first will examine the 2001 district court opinion in In
re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation,164 which highlighted the hurdle that state
long-arm statutes can pose to Calder jurisdiction. The second revisits the
hypothetical posed at the beginning of this Note and applies the analysis
developed so far.
A. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation
The Vitamins Antitrust court declined to find Calder jurisdiction in
eight states, citing the lack of express aiming required by those states’
long-arm statutes.165 At the same time, the court granted effects-test
Litig.), 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003).
161. See Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private
Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-On and Independently Initiated Cases Compared, 74 GEO. L.J.
1163, 1166–70 (1986) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the follow-on cases
compared to independently initiated cases).
162. See, e.g., In re Bulk [Extruded] Graphite Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 02-6030 (WHW),
2006 WL 1084093, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2006).
163. See, e.g., supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
164. Misc. No. 99-197, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25073 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2001).
165. Id. at *64–65.
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jurisdiction in California and Illinois, noting that those states have
“construed Calder and the ‘effects test’ most broadly.”166 Vitamins
Antitrust comprised a large volume of civil litigation that followed a U.S.
criminal investigation of the livestock-vitamin industry in the
mid-1990s.167 The defendants, which included U.S. and foreign companies,
were accused of fixing the price of choline chloride, the B4 vitamin used
in chicken and swine feed, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.168 As
often happens in antitrust cases, guilty pleas in a criminal matter paved the
way for subsequent civil litigation on behalf of direct purchasers. In
Vitamins Antitrust, the civil suits were consolidated in a multi-district
litigation proceeding.169 As is the standard practice in such circumstances,
a single district judge decides pretrial issues for similar cases pending in
many jurisdictions. Therefore, Vitamins Antitrust offered an unusual and
useful state-by-state comparison of Calder’s application to antitrust
allegations pending in a variety of jurisdictions simultaneously.
The Vitamins Antitrust court declined to subject a Belgian corporation,
UCB, to personal Calder jurisdiction in eight states, while granting
effects-test jurisdiction against UCB in California and Illinois.170 Unlike
many of the other civil defendants, UCB had not earlier pleaded guilty in
a criminal proceeding171—thus denying plaintiffs’ attorneys the typically
rich trove of guilty pleas and colloquies that can yield the aiming evidence
like that proffered in Magnetic Audiotape. The Vitamins Antitrust court
had to weigh the case for personal jurisdiction in each state—in some
cases, evaluating the case that UCB itself, and not its subsidiaries or
co-conspirators, aimed anticompetitive conduct specifically at each state.
The court began its analysis by noting that Illinois and California have
construed Calder and the effects test broadly.172 A defendant faced
jurisdiction in Illinois if he committed a tort against an Illinois business so

166. Id. at *58–59.
167. COHEN MILSTEIN HAUSFELD & TOLL PLLC, COHEN MILSTEIN HAUSFELD & TOLL
OBTAINS $150 MILLION VERDICT IN CHOLINE CHLORIDE PRICE-FIXING CLASS ACTION,
http://www.cmht.com/cases_cwcholine.php (last visited July 14, 2008).
168. Id.
169. In re Vitamin Antitrust Litig., No. 1285, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8599, at *3–4 (J.P.M.L.
June 7, 1999).
170. Vitamins Antitrust, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25073, at *64–65.
171. Id. at *19. The court noted that in Execu-Tech Business Systems, Inc. v. New Oji Paper
Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 585 (Fla. 2000), the Florida Supreme Court upheld Calder jurisdiction against
a defendant who pleaded guilty to charges of fixing the price of thermal fax paper. Vitamins
Antitrust, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25073, at *57–58. The Florida court held that jurisdictional
requirements were met by allegations that conspirators had (1) manufactured the product, (2)
pleaded guilty to participating in the conspiracy, and (3) the product had been distributed at the
increased price in every state, including Florida. Id.
172. Id. at *58–59.
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that injury was felt in Illinois.173 California’s analysis was slightly more
complicated, and hinged in part on the presence of antitrust allegations. In
a ruling predating Calder, the California state courts had held that
“effects-test” jurisdiction was reasonable if a foreign defendant caused
effects “‘that the State treats as exceptional and subject to special
regulation.’”174
Plaintiffs’ arguments for jurisdiction in eight other states failed,
however. The common thread in the denials of jurisdiction was the states’
heightened requirements for proving “express aiming.”175 While UCB’s
subsidiaries or co-conspirators might have aimed specifically at the forum
state, UCB itself had not.176 For example, Virginia law required
“‘purposefully targeted conduct.’”177 Georgia required “tortious and
intentional acts . . . specifically directed at plaintiff and his work.”178
Indiana called for “deliberate actions . . . expressly aimed at Indiana and
calculated to have effect in Indiana.”179
Defendants argued against personal jurisdiction by citing the Calder
Court’s observation that the journalists knew their article would damage
Shirley Jones and that she would feel the brunt of her injury in
California.180 The Vitamins Antitrust court found this tack persuasive,
writing: “Defendant is correct that there must be some limits on the
‘effects test’; specifically, courts have held that Calder ‘cannot stand for

173. Id. at *59 (citing Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing
Green v. Advance Ross Elecs. Corp., 427 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (Ill. 1981))).
174. Id. (quoting Quattrone v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 296, 306 (Ct. App. 1975)).
Antitrust allegations addressed by the Cartwright Act qualified as charges subject to special
regulation. Id. n.22.
175. Id. at *61; see also Archer Daniels Midland v. F. Hoffman-Laroche, Ltd. (In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litig.), 270 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2003). In granting Calder jurisdiction against
Chinook, another defendant in the same case, the Vitamins Antitrust court detailed the heightened
demands of the Kansas long-arm statute:
Kansas also recognizes the “effects test,” but requires a more particularized
inquiry as to whether the defendant purposely directed its tortious actions at
Kansas. Following the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, courts in that jurisdiction examine
“prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms
of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing.” Courts further examine
“the contacts created by the out-of-state defendant in committing the alleged tort.”

Vitamins Antitrust, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (citations omitted) (quoting Wempe v. Sunrise Med.
HHG, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Kan. 1999)).
176. Vitamins Antitrust, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25073, at *61 n.24.
177. Id. at *61 (quoting Robinson v. Egnor, 699 F. Supp. 1207, 1214 (E.D. Va. 1988)).
178. Id. (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2000)).
179. Id. (citing Intermatic, Inc. v. Taymac Corp., 815 F. Supp. 290, 297 (S.D. Ind. 1993)).
180. Id. at *62 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984)).
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the broad proposition that a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the
forum state always gives rise to specific jurisdiction.’”181
The plaintiffs attempted to save their cases for personal jurisdiction by
arguing that aiming at the United States as a whole satisfied the aiming
requirement for individual states. They cited Cole v. Tobacco Institute,182
in which a district court found that a British tobacco corporation was
subject to Calder jurisdiction as a matter of “common sense.”183 If a
defendant aimed intentional wrongdoing at more than one state, the
Tobacco Institute court reasoned, then it should satisfy the express aiming
requirement of every one of those states.184 Finding otherwise, the Tobacco
Institute court wrote, would “imply that a party can avoid liability by
multiplying its wrongdoing.”185 While showing sympathy with the
Tobacco Institute court’s argument, the Vitamins Antitrust court hewed to
a narrower reading of Calder: “[T]he fact remains that the remaining fora
have required defendant’s tortious conduct to be specifically and
purposefully directed at those states to satisfy the effects test.”186
By reaching this conclusion, the Vitamins Antitrust court honored the
precedent surrounding the individual forum states’ long-arm statutes. This
careful reading also seems to square with the requirements of due process,
and with the federal courts’ constitutional mandate of limited jurisdiction.
There are other concerns, beyond domestic constitutional and statutory
ones, that argue for a conservative application of Calder jurisdiction,
however. Part of the fallout of globalization is that courts everywhere must
contend with the implications of their rulings on foreign markets,
governments, and persons.187

181. Id. at *62–63 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082,
1087 (9th Cir. 2000)). This narrower reading of Calder seems to fit with the Imo court’s narrow
reading of Calder. See supra notes 84–91 and accompanying text.
182. 47 F. Supp. 2d 812 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
183. Id. at 815.
184. Id. at 815–16.
185. Id. at 815.
186. Vitamins Antitrust, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25073, at *64.
187. One need look no further than the example of Microsoft, which on appeal rebuffed many
of the findings of the U.S. government’s monopolization case, only to have a European Union court
subsequently force it to share some proprietary secrets with rivals. See Steve Lohr & Kevin J.
O’Brien, Microsoft Is Yielding in European Antitrust Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at C1.
Governments’ needs to protect competition and promote efficiency must square with business’ need
for uniformity and predictability in regulation. Moreover, U.S. courts hearing cases involving
international parties have to confront the issue of comity—the extent to which their judgments will
affect the judicial, executive, and legislative acts of other nations. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
comity as “[a] practice among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different
jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (8th ed. 2004). In Magnetic Audiotape, the Second Circuit rejected
the defendant’s argument that bankruptcy proceedings in a Korean court barred the plaintiff’s
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The plaintiff, of course, shoulders the burden of pleading the prima
facie case for Calder jurisdiction. Calder jurisdiction by its nature focuses
on one narrow set of circumstances. Courts have a duty not to extend
Calder beyond its limits, no matter how sympathetic they may be to the
apparent rightness of a cause.188 If the plaintiff can’t meet that burden,
there are always other theories of jurisdiction to plead, and other forums
to seek. One theory commonly pleaded alongside Calder jurisdiction in
antitrust cases is the so-called “conspiracy theory of jurisdiction,” whereby
a proper finding of personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a forum is
imputed to the defendant’s co-conspirator, who has no requisite contacts
with the forum.189 Thus, a denial of Calder jurisdiction does not mean a
death knell for antitrust allegations against a particular defendant.
B. BuyPod Revisited
The opening hypothetical of this Note posed the question of whether
Calder jurisdiction could be used to hale CrabApple into court in West
Dakota. Reconsidering the question in the light of the analysis developed
so far clarifies some of the problems the plaintiffs face in that case.
Reasonableness. While obviously inconvenient and expensive for a
corporation to defend a suit in another state, large corporations routinely
shoulder such burdens. Indeed, in the Microsoft follow-on litigation,
indirect purchasers in numerous state courts pursued actions that Microsoft
was compelled to defend in those states.190 Burger King balanced

antitrust claims. Tex. Int’l Magnetics, Inc. v. Auriga-Aurex, Inc. (In re Magnetic Audiotape
Antitrust Litig.), 334 F.3d 204, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2003). The court held that a dearth of evidence
precluded a proper finding on the issue. Id. at 209. At the same time, however, the court cited
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 for the proposition that “‘courts are not precluded from
engaging in their own information gathering with regard to issues of foreign law.’” Id. More and
more, U.S. courts will have to be mindful of the implications of their rulings when dealing with
international business.
188. See, e.g., Vitamins Antitrust, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25073, at *64 (denying Calder
jurisdiction despite “sympathizing with plaintiffs’ argument . . . [and] even though the Court may
agree with plaintiffs’ position”).
189. See id. at *56 (finding conspiracy theory jurisdiction over the same defendant in
Arkansas, Indiana, Missouri, and Virginia). For a seminal discussion of this issue, not framed for
antitrust cases specifically, see Ann Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish In
Personam Jurisdiction: A Due Process Analysis, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 234 (1983). Another theory
is “alter-ego” jurisdiction, in which a U.S. subsidiary may be so intertwined with its overseas parent
corporation that a finding of personal jurisdiction against the former justifies the imputation of
personal jurisdiction over the latter. See, e.g., In re Bulk [Extruded] Graphite Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
No. 02-6030 (WHW), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29586, at *18–19 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2004); Archer
Daniels Midland v. F. Hoffman-Laroche, Ltd. (In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.), 270 F. Supp. 2d 15,
24–27 (D.D.C. 2003). Personal jurisdiction through § 12 of the Clayton Act is another option in
antitrust cases.
190. See, e.g., William H. Page, Class Certification in the Microsoft Indirect Purchaser
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inconvenience to the defendant against the plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining
relief, and it is doubtful that the obstacles to CrabApple in defending in
West Dakota would be “‘gravely difficult and inconvenient’” enough to
put it at a “‘severe disadvantage.’”191 On the other hand, it is unlikely that
granting jurisdiction in West Dakota, and every other forum in which a
plaintiff’s firm might file a similar complaint, will advance “the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies.”192 Even the economies obtained through multi-district
litigation end at the point of jury selection. On balance, however,
reasonableness by itself probably would not bar Calder jurisdiction, given
the realitites of contemporary civil litigation as seen in the Microsoft case.
Brunt of the injury. Plaintiffs face a heavier burden here. The narrow
language of Calder, emphasized by subsequent opinions like Imo, make
a strong case that the brunt of CrabApple’s alleged harm would never be
felt in West Dakota, given the wide reach of its market, and moreover that
CrabApple would not expect the brunt of the harm to fall in West Dakota.
Express Aiming. The lack of express aiming poses another high hurdle
for Calder jurisdiction. There is a strong argument that CrabApple never
expressly aimed its anticompetitive conduct at West Dakota, given the
state’s relatively miniscule market. And, as previously discussed, without
extrinsic evidence of express aiming, price-fixing lacks the inherent focus
of other, more targeted anticompetitive activity, like boycotts aimed at a
rival. Nor do facts like these support inference of any Asahi-style factors,
such as marketing plans CrabApple directed at West Dakota, or a specially
designed version of the BuyPod designed specifically with West Dakota
consumers in mind. It clearly would be frustrating for a BuyPod owner in
West Dakota, when seeking redress, to lose access to his home forum. But
there are always other theories of jurisdiction, other courts, and other
defendants that in combination might provide the most just outcome.
West Dakota long-arm statute. While many states have long-arm
statutes that extend a state’s personal jurisdiction to constitutional limits,
the existence of a more demanding long-arm in West Dakota could well
be the final blow in the CrabApple plaintiffs’ quest for Calder jurisdiction.
As seen in Vitamins Antitrust, states that impose a more stringent
interpretation of express aiming frequently are inhospitable to claims of
Calder jurisdiction.
In conclusion, it is likely that, given these considerations, the
CrabApple plaintiffs might soon find themselves on the losing side of a
Rule 12(b)(2) order dismissing their case for lack of personal
Litigation, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 303, 303–04 (2005).
191. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) (quoting M/S Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)).
192. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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jurisdiction—notwithstanding their strategic forum shopping.
V. A BROADER TAKE ON CALDER : POLICY AND THE LAW
Courts have to apply Calder carefully to antitrust cases if they are to
observe the limits of due process. Otherwise, courts will fall short of the
“fair play and substantial justice”193 and reasonableness194 standards of the
personal jurisdiction inquiry.195 Lurking behind these traditional issues of
personal jurisdiction, however, are larger judicial and legislative policies.
Despite the due process arguments that seem to favor a narrow use of
Calder, there are other arguments that suggest applying Calder in a
slightly broader fashion than previously discussed. While remaining
faithful to the principles of personal jurisdiction, courts should be mindful
of these other factors when analogizing Calder to antitrust cases.
A. Avoiding a Slide into the Merits
The first rationale for applying Calder somewhat more forgivingly is
that, because of its unusually close focus on the conduct at issue, the
Calder analysis can ineluctably morph into an evaluation of the merits—an
inappropriate analysis on a motion to dismiss, when allegations are
sketchiest and before discovery has developed a more complete record.196
The effects test requires an appraisal, however cursory, of the conduct that
is usually at the heart of the case. It is true that plaintiffs bear the reduced
burden of pleading a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction in the
complaint and in the early stages of litigation.197 The theoretical check on
this more permissive policy is the more intense scrutiny of evidence at the
summary judgment phase, where unwarranted claims can be weeded out.
While this pattern matches the notice pleading and broad discovery
philosophies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it seems clear that
the Supreme Court has become more impatient with subjecting antitrust

193. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
194. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
195. Antitrust cases sometimes involve uniquely complex determinations of personal
jurisdiction and venue. See generally Lee, supra note 95.
196. See, e.g., In re Bulk [Extruded] Graphite Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 02-6030 (WHW),
2007 WL 2212713, at *9 (D.N.J. July 30, 2007); see also Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368
U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (reversing the lower court’s grant of summary judgment against plaintiff, and
stating that “summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where
motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,
and hostile witnesses thicken the plot”).
197. See, e.g., Tex. Int’l Magnetics, Inc. v. Auriga-Aurex, Inc. (In re Magnetic Audiotape
Antitrust Litig.), 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction must include averment of facts).
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defendants to expensive discovery on the basis of thinly-pleaded
complaints.198 Courts, then, have to balance their demands for probative
detail with the sketchy facts of many Calder jurisdiction claims.
B. No Immunity for a “Shotgun” Approach
If the Calder analogy seems to work best on clearly aimed conduct—a
defamatory newspaper story, or a price-fixing conspiracy obviously aimed
at another country’s market199—it seems odd not to seek jurisdiction
against anticompetitive firms that do not practice the virtue of precise
targeting. Why should a price-fixer who aims to control a worldwide
market escape jurisdiction, as opposed to one who targets more narrowly?
Clearly, the Calder analogy can only be stretched so far before it breaks.
And it can scarcely comport with due process to hale a defendant into
court solely because its operations are large and its marketing reach is
broad. Even more practically, it is unlikely that a firm contemplating
illegal conduct will be considering its defenses to evolving theories of
personal jurisdiction, should it be brought into court at some point in the
future. Still, a firm contemplating anticompetitive conduct might be
cynically advised not to make the aiming of its designs too specific. Courts
should be mindful of the potential incentives they create if they find
personal jurisdiction only against actors who target with specificity.
C. The Plain Language of the Sherman Act Suggests Aggressive
Enforcement
Another rationale for applying Calder jurisdiction more liberally is that
the plain words of the Sherman Act, with its severe criminal and civil
penalties—up to ten-year prison sentences and fines of up to $1-million for
natural persons and $100-million for corporations,200 and the provisions for
private plaintiff treble damage actions with attorneys’ fees201—evince
Congress’ strong policy against anticompetitive conduct. The implication
is that courts should therefore read procedural requirements more
forgivingly. There are whispers of this rationale afoot. In In re Bulk
198. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965–67 (2007) (granting motion
to dismiss antitrust complaint for insufficient “factual matter” to support allegations of an
agreement and noting the high cost of abusive discovery demands on antitrust defendants).
199. See Magnetic Audiotape, 334 F.3d at 208.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 2004). Congress approved these tougher penalties in spring 2004.
One commentator noted that the increased penalties followed the Enron and WorldCom accounting
scandals, and years of questions from judges and academics whether criminal antitrust penalties
were too lenient. Melanie Sabo, Congress Poised to Bolster Criminal Antitrust Penalties: An
Update on H.R. 1086, ANTITRUST SOURCE, May 2004, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/atsource/04/05/sabo.pdf.
201. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol60/iss4/4

30

Dougherty: Does a Cartel Aim Expressly? Trusting Calder Personal Jurisdictio

2008]

TRU STIN G C ALDER PERSON AL JU RISD IC TIO N W H EN AN TITRU ST GO ES G LO BAL

945

[Extruded] Graphite Products Antitrust Litigation,202 for example, the
district court declined to apply Imo’s narrow reading of Calder express
aiming to an antitrust case, citing, without elaboration, “[t]he special
character of an antitrust claim.”203 The tradeoff, of course, is that courts
must weigh the costs of haling defendants into court and subjecting them
to the risk and expense of demonstrating their lack of antitrust liability
against the deadweight losses and monopoly profits that competition law
seeks to eliminate. While there is no easy answer, it is clear that the effects
of global trade are broad, and its hazards can be felt as broadly as its
benefits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts should weigh claims of Calder jurisdiction carefully in cases
alleging anticompetitive conduct aimed at a forum state with a demanding
long-arm statute, if they are to stay within the bounds of due process.
Moreover, courts must decline to find Calder jurisdiction when the
allegations fail to demonstrate express aiming. The effects test is a
powerful tool, and regardless of the fact that the result in Calder itself
feels right, the possibility of misapplying Calder is great when the conduct
is anticompetitive rather than libelous. As the Imo court noted, “Calder’s
holding cannot be severed from its facts.”204 The speed and extent of
globalization inspire concern as well as awe, and it is tempting to reach for
Calder jurisdiction if one perceives a far-flung wrong. But as these cases
show, Calder jurisdiction is not always the answer. Courts must remain
mindful that there are usually other theories of jurisdiction—conspiracy
theory, for example—and usually other defendants, perhaps domestic
subsidiaries or affiliates, who might stand in the place of the unreachable
parent corporation. From these alternatives, courts have to fashion what
justice they can. A narrow reading of Calder can be frustrating for antitrust
plaintiffs, but it is necessary if due process is to remain one of this nation’s
most valuable exports.

202. No. 02-6030 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212713 (D.N.J. July 30, 2007).
203. “The special character of an antitrust claim leads the Court to interpret more liberally the
phrase ‘expressly aim[. . .] tortious conduct at the forum such that the forum can be said to be the
focal point of the tortious activity.’ To be sure, plaintiffs’ evidence is thin, but at this stage of the
proceedings it is sufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(2) motion.” Id. at *9 (quoting Imo Indus., Inc. v.
Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 266 (3d Cir. 1998).
204. Imo, 155 F.3d at 261.
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